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Court-Curbing Periods in American History,
Stuart S. Nagel*
Seven periods of intense Court-curbing have occurred in American
history. Due to the Court's unavoidable involvement in the political
process, conflict between the legislative and judicial branches will occur
again when certain judicial provocations and catalytic factors are
present. Professor Nagel examines the factors which have an affirma-
tive correlation with the occurrence of Court-curbing bills, and the
factors which have an affirmative correlation with the success of Court-
curbing bills.
Due to its unavoidable involvement in the political process, the
Supreme Court has often been an object of congressional attack.
Excellent descriptive studies have been made of certain periods of
conflict between Congress and the Court,' but there is a lack of
writing which systematically analyzes relations between Congress and
the Court throughout American history. It is the purpose of this:paper
to analyze in a partially quantitative manner some of the factors which
seem to account for the occurrence or nonoccurrence and for the
success or failure of congressional attempts to curb the Court.
I. IBEsFAncH DESIGN
One hundred and sixty-five instances of bills designed to curb the
Supreme Court were compiled along with information concerning
their content, sponsor, and fate from a perusal of The Congressional
Record and its forerunners and also from the previous literature in
the field.2 In order to keep the data within manageable limits, resolu-
tions and constitutional amendments were not included although they
are introduced frequently and often contain proposals which would
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; member of the Illinois
Bar. The author is very grateful to Nancy J. Fahrnkopf, a former graduate student
at the University of Illinois, for the extensive research work she did for an early draft
of this article.
1. Walter F. Murphy concentrates on the problems of the Warren Court in his book,
CONGREss ArM ThE COURT (1962) as does PmTcnamr, CONGRESS VEasus US= COURT
(1960). Robert Jackson concentrates on the 1937 Court-packing plan in THE STRuGGLE
Fro JuDeCIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDy OF A CRisis IN ARmIcAN Powan PoLrncs (1941).
Walter Murphy's book was especially suggestive in writing some parts of this paper.
2. Ibid. See also Culp, A Survey of Proposals to Limit or Destroy the Power of
Judicial Review by the Supreme Court of the United States, 4 IND. L.J. 386, 474
(1929); Warren, The Early History of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Connection with Modern Attacks on the Judiciary, 8 MAss. 
L.Q. 1 (1922).
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substantially reduce the powers of the Court.3 Relatively narrow bills
designed to reverse a single decision were also excluded. Relying on
the distribution of bills as well as the consensus of historians, seven
time periods as shown in Table I were labeled high-frequency Court-
curbing periods. This identification is both quantitative and qualitative.
For example, the first period covering the years from 1802 to 1804,
had only two instances of overt congressional attempts to curb the
Court, one of which was the unsuccessful impeachment of Justice
Chase. While it may well be a quantitatively marginal period, most
writers agree that this was a time of high friction between the
Federalists on the bench and the Jeffersonians in Congress and the
Administration.
TABLE 1. HIGH AND Low FREQUENCY PERIODS OF COURT-CURBING
IN AmRIcAN HISTORY
High-Frequency Low-Frequency
# of %of # of %of
Years Bills 165 Years Bills 165
1. 1802-1804 2 1% 1. 1789-1801 0 0%
2. 1823-1831 12 7 2. 1805-1822 0 0
3. 1858-1869 22 13 3. 1832-1857 1 1
4. 1893-1897 9 5 4. 1870-1892 8 5
5. 1922-1924 11 7 5. 1898-1921 6 4
6. 1935-1937 37 22 6. 1925-1934 2 1
7. 1955-1957 53 32 7. 1939-1954 2 1
Total 146 87% 19 12%
A criterion by which to judge the relative success or failure of any
one Court-curbing period is more difficult to establish. A total of only
nine out of the 165 bills regulating the Court have passed Congress.
This group of "absolutely successful" bills, representing approximately
five per cent of the total instances, is too small to work with for the
purposes of this study. Three criteria of "relative success" will there-
fore be used. First, how many anti-Court bills during each period were
reported from committee, the lowest stage of the legislative process
aside from introduction? Second, what per cent of the bills introduced
were reported out of committee? The third criterion of success, as
shown in Table 2, is that of determining whether a congressional at-
3. Twenty-five joint resolutions were proposed in 1937 while thirty-three constitu-
tional amendments were introduced during the two year period from 1935 to 1937.
Several attempts have been made, for example in 1867 and 1871, to establish via
Constitutional amendment a new court representing all the states which would have
jurisdiction over constitutional questions. A joint resolution in 1861 demanded the
abolition of the federal judicial system.
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tack has had the effect of changing within the immediate future the
pattern of voting behavior of the Court on the issues which originally
provoked the attack. In four of the seven attacks, the Court did
retreat from its previous controversial policy by executing a tactical
abstention from further similar provocation (as was the case in the
years following the 1804 conflict) or by effecting a reversal of policy
(as was the case in 1937). At the climax of the seventh period, the
Court drew back from its stand on one of the issues which antagonized
Congress-namely a broad interpretation of free speech-but remained
firm on its policies toward segregation and criminal procedure which
were also under congressional fire.
TABLE 2. RELATIVE SUCCESS OF SEVEN HIGH-FREQUENCY
COURT-CURBING PERIODS
Rank Order
Number of Per cent of of Corn-
Years Bills Out Bills Out Judicial Composite posite
of Committee of Committee Retreat Success Success
1. 1802-04 1 50% Yes Yes 3
2. 1823-31 3 25 Yes Yes 4
3. 1858-69 11 50 Yes Yes 1
4. 1893-97 1 11 No No 7
5. 1922-24 2 18 No No 6
6. 1935-37 6 16 Yes Yes 2
7. 1955-59 2 4 Partial No 5
Avg. = 3.7 Avg. 25% Usually Usually
(N 26) per period Yes Yes
The fourth column in Table 2 provides a composite index of overall
success. Thus, a high-frequency period can be considered successful
if it is above average on the number of bills that were reported out
of committee (i.e., four or more); if it is above average on the per cent
of successful bills (i.e., 25% or above); and if it was climaxed by retreat
of the Court on the majority of the issues involved. A period will be
termed relatively successful if it is above average on at least two of
these three criteria. Using this composite standard, four of the seven
high-frequency periods have been classified as relative overall suc-
cesses, and each period has been given a rough success ranking as
shown in the last column of Table 2.
The variables influencing the occurrence and success of the seven
court-curbing periods seem to fit into a model like the psychological
model of stimulus-organism-response. In the political phenomenon
of Court-curbing, the stimulus is represented by judicial provocation.
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The organism is represented by the political system which may con-
tain certain catalytic or conditioning factors which shape the percep-
tion of the provocation and the response. The response manifests
itself in certain types of Court-curbing bills and Presidential action.
This response may feed back on the judiciary and thereby stimulate
judicial counter-action. Having this overall model in mind helps one
to see better the interrelations between the more specific variables
discussed in this paper.
II. JUDICIAL PROVOCATION
A. Quantity of Judicial Review
To what extent does a high quantity of judicial review of legislative
acts provoke Court-curbing regardless of the type of interests in-
volved? Table 3 shows that almost 50 of the total 86 instances of
judicial nullification of federal statutes in American history have
occurred during or within three years prior to the seven Court-curbing
periods. Thus, over half of the instances of judicial nullification have
occurred during a time span equaling less than one-third of the history
of the Supreme Court. The use of judicial review for the first time in
Marbury v. Madison,4 was certainly an irritant in the Federalist-Jeffer-
sonian dispute over relative amounts of judicial and executive power
in the early 1800's. The nullification of state bankruptcy and debtor
laws as well as the invalidation of a Maryland act taxing the Bank of
the United States provoked the wrath of congressmen in the 1820's.1
The 1858 Dred Scott case6 nullified a federal statute, and congressional
anticipation of judicial review of Reconstruction legislation led to
the court-packing and restrictions on habeas corpus in the 1860's. The
1890's attack was precipitated in part by the invalidation of a federal
income tax law, and nullification of federal and state economic legisla-
tion led to another Progressive attack on the Court in the 1920's. The
judicial review of fifteen New Deal statutes was a prime causative
factor in the 1930's conflict. In the 1950's, portions of federal and
state laws were held unconstitutional, and proposed legislation such
as the Jenner bill was clearly aimed at several decisions. In short, all
the periods of intense Court-curbing have been provoked to some
degree by the judicial review of legislative acts. Nullification of federal
statutes, however, seems to provide a greater provocation than nullifi-
cation of state statutes since judicial review of state statutes seemed
to be a prime factor only in the 18 2 0's Court-curbing period and
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
6. 60 U.S. (19 How:) 393 (1857).
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partially in the 1950's. Congress is apparently more protective of its
own lawmaking than it is of the various state legislative bodies.
TABLE 3. OCCURRENCE OF JUDIcIAl, REvIEw DURING AND 3 YEARS
PRIORTO THE HIGH-FREQUENCY COURT-CURBING PERIODS
Instances of judicial review of federal









*Judicial review of state acts present
If the seven periods are divided into the periods of relatively high
judicial review of federal legislation and relatively low, then as Table
4 shows, a slightly greater proportion of the relatively high review
periods involved relatively successful Court-curbing bills than did the
relatively low review periods. Thus, the intensity of judicial review
may be a partial determinant of the success of controversial Court-
curbing bills as well as a determinant of the introduction of Court-
curbing bills. There are, however, more important determinants- of
Court-curbing success as will be shown later.














B. Subject of the Provoking Cases
The specific issues over which conflict has occurred whether from
judicial review cases or other cases can be divided into four categories
-economic regulation, civil liberties, federal-state relations, ' and gen-
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eral separation of powers. Table 5 indicates that first, economic regu-
lation has been involved to some extent in four of the seven high-
frequency periods. Civil liberties and federal-state relations have
each been at issue in two periods, while general separation of powers
at the national level has been the main controversy in only the earliest
period.





a. Business Regulation 1930's Yes
1890's No
1820's Yes
b. Labor Relations 1890's No
1920's No
c. Taxes 1890's No
2. Civil Liberties
a. Segregation 1950's No
b. First Amendment 1950's Partial
1860's Yes





4. Separation of Powers in
the National Government 1800's Yes
Trends in the frequency or occurrence of certain issues are apparent.
For example, the attacks during the first half of the nineteenth-cen-
tury were largely concerned with federal-state relations and separa-
tion of powers, a fact which can be explained in part by the youth
of the country. At this time, the power distribution between the parts
of the newly established federal system was not at all clear, this
question being a dividing point between the two political parties as
well-as a major public issue. From the latter half of the nineteenth
century through 1937, the basic issue in Congress-Court relations
was that of economic regulation. Conflict over civil liberties has
occurred intermittently but particularly in recent years.
From the data in Table 5 one might also be able to say that
[ VOL. 18
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court-curbing bills are more likely to succeed where federal-state
relations or separation of powers represent the prime subject matters
involved. On the other hand, where intensely held economic interests
or civil libertarian interests are involved, the likelihood of court-
curbing success is decreased.
C. Unanimity of Provoking Cases
Does the degree of conflict within the Supreme Court influence
the occurrence of congressional Court-curbing? The degree of conflict
within the Court can be measured by the degree of unanimity in key
decisions at a given time. Using the statements of various writers
and congressmen as to what cases provoked the anti-Court bills, the
voting split on these controversial decisions was determined. The
average degree of unanimity for all the periods was 76% which means
that there was an average of two to three dissents in the cases pro-
voking the attacks. This number contracts with the higher degree
of unanimity normally found in the totality of Supreme Court cases.
The results of Table 6 support the hypothesis that during periods
in which there is a relatively high (i.e., above average) degree of
disagreement between members of the Court (and thus high con-
troversy), congressional attack is more likely to occur.
TABLE 6. DEGREE OF UNANIMITY IN TlE SUPREME COURT AND
nH EFFECT ON OCCURRENCE AND SUCCESS OF COURT-CURBING
Degree of Relative
Periods Unanimity Success
1800's 100% relatively high Yes
1820's 89 rel. high Yes
1860's 59 rel. low Yes
1890's 72 rel. low No
1920's 69 rel. low No
1930's 69 rel. low Yes
1950's 76 rel. high No
Avg. - 76%
Contrary to what one might expect Table 6 shows that a slightly
greater proportion of the high unanimity (rather than the low
unanimity) periods involved relatively successful Court-curbing bills.
However, the high unanimity in the 1800's and the 1820's does not
necessarily indicate complete unity on the part of the Court. It may





A. Parties and Factions in Congress
To what extent does party composition and the presence of factions
in Congress during high-frequency time periods act as a catalytic or
enabling factor influencing the occurrence and outcome of the attack?
In five of the seven high-frequency periods, the Democratic party or
its forerunners have dominated the Congress. A tabulation of the
party affiliation of the individual sponsors of the bills also reveals
that Democrats have sponsored over twice as much anti-court legis-
lation than have Republicans. This relationship, however, does not
mean that having a Democratic Congress is sufficient to provoke
Court-curbing bills, for many Democratic Congresses have enjoyed
smooth relations with the Court. It does suggest that, when other
factors have been present, the existence of a Democratic Congress may
have stimulated the occurrence of Court-curbing. Thus, the pattern
has been such that when the Court has been defending property
rights as in the 1930's and 1820's, the Democrats were more likely to
attack it, and the Republicans were more likely to defend it. On the
other hand, although to a lesser extent, when the Court has been
defending civil liberties as in the 1950's and 1860's, the Republicans
were more likely to be attacking it, and the Democrats (at least the
Northern Democrats) were more likely to be defending it. This
phenomenon can be explained by the socio-economic bases of the two
parties, and the frequent attacks of the Democrats point up the
fact that the Supreme Court has more often defended property rights
than civil liberties.
Perhaps a more adequate description of the groups attacking the
Court would replace the party labels with conservative or liberal
designations. Table 7 shows that liberal groups have attacked the
Court in six of the seven periods, and conservative groups (represent-
ing a coalition between wings of the Republican and Democratic
parties) attacked the Court for the first time in the 1950's. Future
attacks on the Supreme Court will also probably come from conserva-
tive forces given the increased power of liberal urbanism in the
United States, a power which since 1932 has been increasingly making
itself felt in the electoral college system that chooses the President,
and thus indirectly in the President's choices for Supreme Court
Justices.
TABLE 7. THE RELATION BETWEEN PARTY IN CONGRESS AND Tim
OCCUBPENCE OF COURT-CURBING BILLs


















The above discussion focused on the relation between party (or
faction) and the occurrence of a Court-curbing period. There is also
a relationship between the party sponsoring Court-curbing legislation
and the success of the attacks. Thus, when the percentage of
Democrats in Congress is high (over 65 per cent), Democratic bills
are more likely to succeed, and less likely to succeed when the
percentage of Democrats in Congress is low.7 Similarly, Republican
bills are more likely to succeed when the percentage of Republicans
in Congress is high as is shown in Table 8. These relations, however,
are much weaker than one would expect to find in a more disciplined
two-party system. A group's leadership in Congress may be as im-
portant as its numerical strength and may strongly influence the
cohesiveness of the group. For example, the skillful leadership of
Senators O'Mahoney and Wheeler in 1937, and Lyndon Johnson in
1958, is credited by some writers as being an important factor in the
defeat of anti-court legislationY
TABLE 8. RELATIONS BETWEEN SPONSOBING PARTY AND RELATIVE
SUCCEss OF CouRT-CuRiNG BLLs
(Where Sponsor and Party are Known)
Democratic Bills
65% or More
less Dems. than 65%








less Reps. than 65%






66 (100%) 35 (100%) 25(100%) 16(100%)
7. "Per cent Democrats in Congress" equals
1/2 ( House Dems Senate Dems
House Dems + Reps - Senate Dems + Reps
"per cent Republicans in Congress."








B. Party and Factional Differences Between Congress and the Court
Is there a relationship between (1) party or factional differences
between Congress and the Court, and (2) the occurrence of Court-
curbing bills? As Table 9 shows, a slightly greater proportion of
Congresses having a dominant (i.e., majority) party different from the
Court's dominant party were Congresses from the Court-curbing
periods. It is also relevant to note that of 142 Court-curbing bills for
which the Democratic or Republican affiliation of the sponsor was
known, 39 were introduced by Congressmen of the party opposite to
the party that dominated the Court when the bill was introduced.
Congresses where the same party did not dominate both houses of
Congress were eliminated from Table 9, as were Congresses where
the Court had an equal number of Democrats and Republicans.
TABLE 9. PARTY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONGRE.ss AND Tim CoUR'T
DURING Tim HIGH AND LoW COURT-CURBING PERIoDs
Congresses Dominated Congresses Dominated
by a Party Also by a Party Not
Dominating the Court Dominating the Court




56 (100%) 23 (100%)
The above analysis tends to show a weak causal relation between
Congress-Court party splits and an upsurge of Court-curbing bills. If,
however, one hypothesizes that a party split between Congress and
the Court is an important condition or catalyst rather than a cause,
then Table 10 below is more relevant. It shows that all seven high
frequency periods involved party or factional differences between
Congress and the Court.
TABLE 10. THE RELAION BETWEEN CONGREss-CoURT PARTY OR
FACTIONAL SPLITS AND THE OCCURRENCE OF COURT-CURBING BiLLs
High Occurrence Party Sponsoring Party Dominating
Period Majority of Bills the Court
1800's Jeffersonians Federalists
1820's States-Rights Dems. Nationalists
1860's Republicans Democrats
1890's Democrats Republicans
1920's Liberal Reps. Conservative Reps.
1930's Democrats Republicans




The degree of composite success of a congressional attack also
correlates with the degree of party split between Congress and the
Court. All three periods during which there was a sharp party split
can be considered successful, whereas three out of the four periods
during which there was not so sharp a split can be considered
relatively unsuccessful as is shown in Table 11. This table like Table
9 but unlike Table 10 only considers party splits and not factional
splits. The relationship between relative success and party differences
can be accounted for in part by the fact that when Congress represents
a different party than the Court, then legislation introduced by mem-
bers of that party and particularly legislation directed against policies
of the opposite party will be more apt to get out of committee than
legislation introduced by the minority party. In addition, when there
is a party split between Congress and the Court, public opinion is
more apt to be on the side of Congress since that body, by virtue of
its short terms, is more responsive to changes in the public sentiment.
It follows that when the public consensus is at odds with the policies
of the Supreme Court, anti-Court legislation will not only increase
in volume but will have a better chance of being seriously considered.
TABLE 11. RELATION BETWEEN CONGRESS-COURT PARTY
DIFFEREcEs AND = RELAnrvE SUCCESS OF
COURT-CURBING BILLS
Not so sharp






A third catalytic or enabling factor which may accelerate or de-
celerate congressional reaction to judicial provocation is the presence
or absence of a crisis. Although the outbreak of war or depression may
not directly cause attacks on the Court, one might hypothesize that
when judicial provocation has first occurred, the presence or absence
of a crisis may affect the speed and manner with which Congress
reacts. Crisis may be defined as a period of depression, economic
panic, war (including cold war), or post war readjustment. In light








some degree of crisis has been present as is shown in Table 12. The
two classic examples of this relationship are the periods of the 1860's
and 1930's. These attacks, which are perhaps the most famous and
serious attempts to curb the Court, occurred during or just after two
of the most serious crises which this country has had to suffer, the
Civil War and the Great Depression.
TABLE 12. RELATION BETWEEN CRISIS AND TIM OCCURRENCE
OF COURT-CURBING BILLS
High Occurrence
Period Type of Crisis








The relationship between crisis and the success of Court-curbing is
more difficult to determine, but a positive correlation is suggested by
the outcome of at least two of the high frequency periods. The attacks
of the 1860's and 1930's which followed or accompanied great crises
in American history were both highly successful in relation to the
other periods. The two most unsuccessful attacks, the 1890's and
1920's, occurred during periods of low degrees of crisis. The other






RELATION BETWEEN CRisis AND THE SucciEss OF
COURT-CURBING BILLS






D. Public Opinion and Pressure Groups
The element of public opinion should also be included in the
discussion of catalytic or enabling factors which, through their
presence or absence, accelerate or temper congressional attacks upon
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the Supreme Court. The lack of extensive public opinion polls prior
to recent years hinders scientific research and measurement of the
impact of this factor on Court-curbing activity. An estimation of
public support or disapproval for legislative policies toward the Court
could be made through the rather crude method of analyzing the
results of elections occurring immediately prior to or during periods
of congressional attacks on the Court. An analysis of this sort would
point, for example, to the landslide of 1936 which Roosevelt inter-
preted as a mandate for the New Deal and possibly for some kind of
Court-curbing scheme. Public opinion polls taken at various stages
of the fight over Roosevelt's Court-packing bill in the Senate indicate,
however, that public opinion turned against his scheme after the
election.9 Another technique would involve the detailed analysis of
newspaper comment, comments from the Congressional Record, and
other contemporary publications which tend to record the issues and
sentiment of the time. This type of analysis would, however, pri-
marily reflect the sentiments of the upper, more literate classes just as
election analysis would reflect the sentiment in respect to broad policy
rather than the specific Court-curbing issue.
Pressure groups, representing certain segments of public opinion,
have been active during legislative attacks upon the Court. Again,
their influence cannot be measured, but general comments about
their probable roles can be made. In the 1930's the American Bar
Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the Ameri-
can Liberty League were the principle defenders of the Court, while
the AFL-CIO was a principle attacker. In the 1950's the NAACP
and ACLU defended, and the White Citizens Councils and American
Legion did some of the attacking. In both of these instances, the
liberal pressure groups only partly won the battle since the actual
outcome was dependent on the operation of a number of variables.
One can readily hypothesize, however, that when strong, prestigious
groups are on the side of Congress, the attack is strengthened, and
when such groups defend the Supreme Court, the attack is weakened.
E. Regionalism
Regionalism is a catalytic factor like political party. When a judicial
policy particularly affects one region of the country, the concerted
efforts of that region's congressional representatives can strengthen
t], negative response of Congress. For example, ten of the twelve
anti-Court bills introduced during the 1820's were sponsored by
9. Murphy gives the results of Gallup polls taken during the Court fight in 1937,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 61. Not only did the public increasingly disapprove of the
Court-packing plan, but the President's personal popularity also fell during this period.
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Southerners in general and Kentuckians in particular who had been
provoked by the Court's invalidation of land and debtor laws. Does
one region of the country generally tend to be involved in Court-
curbing more than others? Table 14 indicates that of the three main
regions of the country-south, west, and north-the west and north
have been slightly more involved in Court-curbing than the south.
This pattern is explained in part by considering the relationship be-
tween regionalism and issues. Economic issues such as those at stake
in the 1890's, 1920's, and 1930's evoke a northern and western response,
while the states rights issues of the 1800's, 1820's, and 1950's evoke a
southern response. This relationship is explained by the socio-econo-
mic makeup of the various regions with the north and west being
industrial and populist-wheat centers, while the south has been the
locus of plantation agriculture and the negro problem.
TABLE 14. RELATIONSHIP OF REGIONALISm To Tim OccuntnEcE
AND SuccEss OF COURT-CURBING
Period Regional Sponsors Success
1800's Southern and Western Yes
1820's Southern and Western Yes
1860's Northern Yes
1890's Northern and Western No
1920's Northern and Western No
1930's Northern and Western Yes
1950's Southerners and Northern
Conservatives No
In terms of success, the south has enjoyed success in two-thirds of
its attempts to curb the Court, while the north and west have been
successful in approximately half of their attempts. If the Court-curb-
ing periods are ranked as in Table 2, however, two of the most suc-
cessful periods, the 1860's and 1930's, were predominantly northern
sponsored attacks. An explanation for this is the fact that the northern
states are more heavily represented in Congress, and the north enjoyed
an additional advantage in the 1860's conflict since the south and the
Democratic Party were largely incapacitated. An analysis of regional-
ism points up the fact that congressional attacks upon the Supreme
Court are often regional attacks, and that the Court has never really
been faced with a united, national enemy which, along with public
opinion and other factors, may account in part for the generally low
degree of success Court-curbing bills have had.
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F. House and Senate Procedure
The House of Representatives has been almost twice as active in
Court-curbing as the Senate, sponsoring 98 bills to the Senate's 57.
What accounts for the greater volume of bills originating in the
House? First, the difference may not be as great as it seems. Since
the membership of the House is over four times as large as that of the
Senate, one would expect the House to sponsor a greater amount of
bills than the Senate on any issue. Second, House members, subject
to biennial elections, might be more sensitive to short-run changes of
sentiment than are Senate members. In addition the smaller, more
homogeneous constituencies of House members are possibly more con-
ducive to sponsoring Court-curbing bills and other extreme legislation
which would be too divisive in a larger constituency. A third factor is
that Senate members may sponsor bills jointly, whereas House bills
can carry the name of only one sponsor, a practice tending to produce
duplicate bills. Procedure then is a catalyst tending to affect the
relative volume of bills generated in each house of Congress.
The Senate, in spite of its lower number of bills, has had a greater
degree of success in getting its Court-curbing legislation out of com-
mittee. Almost one-fourth of the Senate bills got out of committee
while only 13% of the House bills ever did. For reasons mentioned
above, the House possibly tends to introduce harsher measures which
therefore have a smaller chance of success. In addition, the practice of
introducing duplicate bills in the House lowers its average of success
for individual bills.
IV. CoNG1 ssioNAL AND PRESiDENTiAL RESPONSE
A. Congressional Response
Several courses of action are available to the congressmen seeking-
to attack the policies of the Supreme Court. At the local level, he can
participate in nullification movements to register disapproval of a
particular decision. In Congress, he can attempt retaliation via the
fiscal powers, introduce restrictive constitutional amendments, sponsor
legislation to overturn a statutory interpretation, initiate joint resolu-
tions or investigations, or, if a Senator, he can attempt to block a
Presidential nominee for the bench. Although these methods account
for a good share of the activity during congressional attacks on the
Court, this paper and the following table is concerned only with
specific bills designed directly or indirectly to change some general
policy of the Court.
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TABLE 15. TYPs oF BnTs P'RoposE To Cmux T=E SuPREME CounT
Frequency Relative Success
Number Iof Number %of
1 165 Type
1. Judicial Review












b. Size of Court
c. Retirement
d. Appointing.
e. Give states equal representation
Total:
3. Jurisdiction
a. Regulate and define general
appellate jurisdiction
b. Repeal Supreme Court
jurisdiction over state
c. Limit jurisdiction in special cases:
1) Habeas corpus appeals
2) Reconstruction
3) Public schools




b. Amend judicial code
c. Amend rules of practice
and procedure
d. Facilitate decisions on con-
stitutional questions
Total:
5. Curtail Contempt or
Injunction Powers
6. Miscellaneous
a. Let lower court ignore non-
legalistic Sup. Ct. decisions
b. Change doctrine of pre-
emptive federalism
49 30% 5 10% Avg.
24 15 0 0
13 8 5 38
7 4 3 43
4 2 1 25
1 1/2 0 0
49 291/2% 9 18% Avg.
23 14 3 13
3 2 1 33
3 2 2 67
1 0 0
7 4 0 0
8 5 1 12
45 27/2% 7 16% Avg.
6 4 3 50
4 2 2 50
1 0 0
1 1 0 0
12 756 5 42% Avg.
4 2 3 75
2 1 0 0
1 1 I 100
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c. Postpone meeting of Court 1 Y/2 1 100
d. Impeachment 1 1 100
e. Give some body direct review 1 Y2 0 0
over Sup. Ct. decisions
Overall Total: 165 100% 32 19% Avg.
After the congressman has decided to attack the power of the
judges and to do it through legislative means, he still has a range of
alternatives from which to choose. Table 15 indicates that about 30%
of the Court-curbing bills dealt with regulating or abolishing judicial
review which particularly includes bills requiring special concurrences
to declare statutes unconstitutional. Another 29% dealt with matters
of Court personnel, particularly qualifications (like lengthy prior
judicial experience) for holding a Supreme Court judgeship. Within
this 29% are also included thirteen bills designed to increase or
decrease the size of the Court so as to allow a new President to make
new appointments or to keep him from making new appointments.
About 28% of the bills attempted to restrict the court's appellate
jurisdiction, and the relatively few remaining bills dealt with various
procedural and miscellaneous matters.
Some measures have been peculiar to one time period. Bills cur-
tailing the contempt and injunction powers were predominant, for
example, during the period of the Progressives' attack on the Court,
particularly before the enactment of the Clayton Act.10 Bills pertain-
ing to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court in respect to public
schools, and bills abolishing the doctrine of pre-emptive federalism
were characteristic of the 1955-1959 conflict. The broad historic trend
has been away from bills which would remove or circumscribe a
broad area of the Court's power and toward those bills which would
limit a small, more specific part of the Court's functions. For example,
the only serious attempt at impeachment occurred in 1804. Bills
advocating the repeal of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789
which would be tantamount to removing the Court's appellate juris-
diction over state courts were concentrated in the first half of the
nineteenth century. Unsuccessful bills providing for equal representa-
tion of the states on the Court were proposed prior to 1870, and thus
those groups favoring such a change have recently resorted to a con-
stitutional amendment via a constitutional convention. In contrast,
many bills proposed during the intense conflict in 1937 were designed
to effect changes in the quorum, retirement of Justices, and size of
the Court. In the attack on the Warren Court, many bills prescribed
limitation of jurisdiction in special cases dealing with subversion,
10. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
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public schools, and (after 1961) reapportionment. More extreme bills
in the earlier years may be attributable to the fact that in the early
nineteenth century, the role of the judicial branch of the government
was not yet established, and the obvious partisanship of some justices
during the very early years was a hindrance to the growth of the
judicial myth. In addition, history has shown that bills removing com-
paratively smaller amounts of the Court's power have the greatest
prospect of success. Astute congressmen may well have taken note
of this fact. One, however, should note that although the severity
of bills during the Warren and Roosevelt courts was lower than in
prior periods, the quantity of bills was higher. This possibly indi-
cated a more widespread discontent toward specific decisions and a
lack of cohesive leadership by the anti-Court forces which kept these
forces from centering on one or a few bills.
With regard to the matter of success, ten of the twenty-three cate-
gories of bills had a higher percentage of relative success (i.e., got out
of committee) than the average of 19%. These ten types of bills
included repealing jurisdiction over state supreme courts, limiting
jurisdiction in regard to habeas corpus appeals, changing the rules
concerning retirement and the size of the Court, restricting the Court's
procedure, and limiting the Court's contempt and injunction powers.
Most of the ten types could be considered as limited means of curbing
the Court. The substantially higher rate of success for the relatively
milder bills can be explained by the fact that during all the time
periods, there has been a sizable opposition in Congress to any at-
tempts to curb the Supreme Court-a factor which necessitates com-
promise.
B. Presidential Response
To what extent have Presidents become involved in Court-curbing
and what effect has their participation had on the outcome of
congressional court conflicts? Four Presidents have been openly
critical of the Court during the high-frequency periods, i.e., Jefferson,
Jackson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt, but not Eisenhower or the Presidents
of the 1920's or 1890's. Presidents have been hesitant to openly initiate
Court-curbing legislation. FDR's Court packing plan of 1937 was an
exception, but it was only one of numerous anti-Court bills introduced
in the 1930's. This presidential reluctance is possibly due to a fear
of alienating the Court's numerous defenders in Congress and the
public (as well as a respect for the independence of the judiciary),
and in some instances to a favorable presidential attitude toward the
Court's policies.
With regard to the success of individual bills, Roosevelt's Court-
packing bill was reported out of committee unfavorably. This is
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attributable to inadequate cultivation of support in Congress and
among the public and to reversals by the Court itself. In view of the
Court's retreat, however, the Roosevelt period can be considered a
relative success. Presidents also have administrative weapons to either
thwart or aid orders of the Supreme Court, and ultimately via his
appointive power the President can change the Court's policies.
Nevertheless, with the astute use of his tools of leadership, the
President can be a powerful figure both in the initiation and successful
outcome of Court-curbing bills. With his active support Court-curbing
legislation is probably more likely to pass, and without it, such
legislation is more likely to fail.
V. JUDIcIAL CONTErACTrION
The behavior pattern of the Court-curbing process does not end
with the action taken by Congress and the President. The Supreme
Court can affect the outcome of legislative attacks by its reaction.
First, the members of the Court can individually refute the charges
made by congressmen. Prior to 1937, however, the judicial myth of
aloofness from political disputes was generally followed by the Court.
The only exceptions to this pattern was Marshall's criticism of Jefferson
in Marbury v. Madison, Chase's partisan opinions, and Taney's criti-
cism of Lincoln. The 1937 conflict involved the direct participation of
members of the Court and included Brandeis' testimony before the
Judiciary Committee, Hughes' letter to the sympathetic leaders in
Congress defending the Court, and the timeliness of Van Deventer's
retirement.
Second, the Court as a whole can counteract legislative attack by
retreating from the policy stand which originally provoked the attack.
In terms of frequency, this has happened in four of the seven high
frequency periods. The four periods involve the early 1800's conflict,
the 1820's, the 1860's, and the 1930's. In 1959, the Court retreated
in one of the three fields (free speech, segregation, and criminal proce-
dure) which originally provoked the attack. In the 1890's and 1920'-
on the other hand, a conservative Court protected by a Republican
Congress easily withstood the disorganized attacks of the Democrats,
Populists, and Progressives without having to resort to a retreat.
Since the composite index of success includes retreat as a major
criterion, all four of the above mentioned Court-curbing periods, by
definition, can be called successful. In short, when the Court removes





Periods of intense Court-curbing bills have occurred only seven
times during the 170 year history of the United States. Nevertheless,
this mode of conflict between the legislative and judicial branches
will no doubt recur when certain judicial provocations and catalytic
factors are present.
The factors which have an affirmative correlation with the occur-
rence of Court-curbing bills are (in the order presented) as follows:
(1) judicial review of federal and state statutes, (2) economic issues
rather than other issues, (3) low degree of unanimity within the
Supreme Court, (4) Democratic or liberal Congress when the Court
is conservative, (5) Republican or conservative Congress when the
Court is liberal, (6) crisis present, (7) public opinion and powerful
pressure groups favor the attack, (8) the process for introducing bills
in the House, and (9) the lack of cohesive Congressional leadership.
The factors which have an affirmative correlation with the success
of Court-curbing bills (in the order presented) are as follows: (1)
sponsored by the majority party in Congress, (2) party split between
the Court and Congress, (3) crisis present and allegedly made more
severe by the Court's decisions, (4) public and pressure group support,
(5) northern sponsored attack, (6) introduced in Senate, (7) limited
in purpose, and (8) has presidential support and cohesive congres-
sional leadership.
Although an accurate measurement of the relative importance of
these factors to Court-curbing cannot be made, a behavior pattern
which invariably occurs in such conflicts can be described. The
sequence of events involves judicial provocation, the existence of
circumstances which act as catalysts or as retarders, a set of congres-
sional and presidential responses, and judicial counteraction. This
model which is based on the psychological model of stimulus, organ-
ism, response, and feedback can perhaps also be profitably applied to
analyzing other legal and political phenomena.
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